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Pilot Exercise—Pre-Commitment        
Approach to Market Risk       
Jill Considine
An international group of ten banking organizations (the
“Participating Institutions”) participated in a pilot (the
“Pilot”) of the pre-commitment approach to capital
requirements for market risks (the “Pre-Commitment
Approach”). The Pre-Commitment Approach was described
in the request for comments published by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal
Reserve Board”) in 60 Fed. Reg. 38142 (July 25, 1995). In
brief, under the Pre-Commitment Approach, banks would
specify the amount of capital they wished to allocate to
cover market risk exposures over a given period, subject to
penalties if trading losses over that period exceeded this
precommitted amount.
The Pilot was organized by The New York Clearing
House Association (the “Clearing House”). The Participating
Institutions were BankAmerica Corporation, Bankers Trust
New York Corporation, the Chase Manhattan Corpora-
tion, Citicorp, First Chicago NBD Corporation, First
Union Corporation, the Fuji Bank Limited, J.P. Morgan &
Co. Incorporated, NationsBank Corporation, and Swiss
Bank Corporation. This is their report on the Pilot.
SUMMARY
Set forth below in Part I is a discussion of the background
of the Pilot; in Part II, conclusions arising out of the conduct
of the Pilot; and in Part III, the Participating Institutions’
views as to the next steps. The Pilot left the Participating
Institutions with three core conclusions: 
• that the Pre-Commitment Approach is a viable alter-
native to the internal models approach for establish-
ing the capital adequacy of a trading business for
regulatory purposes. When properly structured and
refined, it should be implemented as an alternative,
and not an “add-on,” to existing capital standards; 
• that, for progress to be made, it is essential that the
bank regulatory agencies participate actively with
the banking industry in the effort to refine how the
Pre-Commitment Approach would be implemented
in practice; and 
• that the most important remaining question requir-
ing an answer is what penalty would result for an
institution that incurs losses in its trading business
exceeding its pre-committed amount for a relevant
period.
I. BACKGROUND
The complexity and diversity of activities conducted by
banking organizations and other financial institutions have
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increasingly apparent to the Participating Institutions,
and increasingly recognized by bank regulators as well,
that a standardized “one-size-fits-all” regulatory approach,
whether as to capital or other matters, is becoming less and
less appropriate. With regard to bank capital standards for
market risks, the Basle supervisors recognized this view in
1995 by developing the internal models approach as an
alternative to the standardized model issued two years
earlier. The Pre-Commitment Approach builds upon the
logic of the internal models approach by having each
banking organization develop its capital requirements in
relation to the organization’s own activities. By relying
on economic incentives instead of on fixed rules, the
Pre-Commitment Approach stands at the opposite end of
the spectrum from the one-size-fits-all approach.
In a comment letter to the Federal Reserve Board
dated October 31, 1995, the member banks of the Clearing
House suggested that the Federal Reserve Board and other
regulators consider adoption of the Pre-Commitment
Approach for two reasons. First, the Pre-Commitment
Approach might constitute a way to establish effectively
a relationship between an institution’s calculation of
value at risk for management purposes and prudent capital
requirements for regulatory purposes. Second, the Pre-
Commitment Approach by its nature results in capital
requirements for market risks tailored to the particular
circumstances of each institution; it thereby solves the one-
size-fits-all problem of the standardized model in the Basle
capital standards while avoiding the inaccuracies created
by the rigid, uniform quantitative standards imposed by
the internal models approach. The letter also suggested
that one or more institutions apply the Pre-Commitment
Approach on a trial basis; the suggestion was the genesis of
the Pilot described in this report.
The purpose of the Pilot was to provide further
information and experience to the Federal Reserve Board,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the
“OCC”)—collectively, the “U.S. Agencies”—as well as to
the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan in Japan, and
the Federal Banking Commission in Switzerland—
together with the U.S. Agencies, the “Agencies”—as well
as to the Participating Institutions themselves, as to the
usefulness and viability of the Pre-Commitment Approach
for regulatory purposes as applied to the Participating
Institutions’ trading portfolios and activities. In addition,
the appropriate relationship between (i) “value at risk”
and other measurements of risk, on the one hand, and
(ii) the appropriate regulatory capital level, on the other,
is unique to each institution and its circumstances. It
was hoped that the Pilot would generate practical expe-
rience concerning that relationship for the Participating
Institutions.
The Pilot was conducted under the assumption
that, in practice, the Pre-Commitment Approach would be
a substitute for other market risk capital standards, and
not an additional capital measurement or requirement to
be added to other capital standards or requirements. In
addition, the Clearing House, as well as several of the
Participating Institutions individually, are on record as
believing that the appropriate penalty for exceeding
pre-committed capital levels is disclosure by the affected
institution that a loss exceeding its pre-committed capital
amount for the relevant period has occurred. The Partici-
pating Institutions conducted the Pilot under the assump-
tion that the penalty would be disclosure.
Prior to commencing the Pilot, the Participating
Institutions held several meetings with the U.S. Agencies
to discuss the upcoming Pilot, how it should be conducted,
and what it might accomplish. The non-U.S. Participating
Institutions met with the relevant Agencies in their coun-
tries as well. Following these meetings, the Participating
Institutions agreed upon the purpose, scope, and mechanics
of the Pilot. 
In particular, the Participating Institutions agreed
that the Pilot would be conducted for four quarterly mea-
surement periods (“Measurement Periods”) corresponding
to calendar quarters as well as to customary reporting periods
for both call report purposes and reporting under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934. The Measurement Periods
were (i) October 1, 1996, through December 31, 1996;
(ii) January 1, 1997, through March 31, 1997; (iii) April 1,
1997, through June 30, 1997; and (iv) July 1, 1997,
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The Pilot was conducted by the Participating
Institutions on a consolidated basis. Accordingly, pre-
committed capital amounts and related P&L Changes (as
defined below) were identified for, and took into account,
the consolidated trading operation, including activities in
bank subsidiaries as well as Section 20 subsidiaries.
Prior to the commencement of each Measurement
Period, (i) each Participating U.S. Institution will identify
in writing to the Board and to the Agency that is the
primary regulator for its lead bank subsidiary (together,
its “Primary Regulators”), as well as to the Clearing
House, its pre-committed capital amount for the upcoming
Measurement Period; and (ii) each non-U.S. Participating
Institution will identify to the Agency that is its primary
regulator (its “Primary Regulator”), as well as to the
Clearing House, its pre-committed capital amount for the
upcoming Measurement Period. That amount was eventually
compared with the change in the relevant Participating
Institution’s trading profits and losses (the “P&L Change”)
for the relevant Measurement Period based upon all of such
Participating Institution’s consolidated trading activities
(both proprietary and for its customers), not just its
proprietary account. Accordingly, the P&L Change took
into account, in addition to net gains or losses from
proprietary trading, (i) brokerage fees, (ii) dealer spreads,
(iii) net interest income before taxes associated with trad-
ing positions, and (iv) the net change between the begin-
ning and end of the Measurement Period in the
Participating Institution’s reserves maintained against its
trading activities. 
The pre-committed capital amount identified by a
Participating Institution for a Measurement Period covered
both general market risk and specific risk arising out of such
Participating Institution’s trading portfolios and activities
for the relevant period.1 This approach is consistent with
defining the P&L Change with which a pre-committed
capital amount is compared as the change in the relevant
Participating Institution’s trading profits and losses for the
relevant Measurement Period from all sources and risks.
Each Participating Institution delivered to the
Agency that is its primary regulator an “Individual Institu-
tion Report” for each Measurement Period. These Individual
Institution Reports contained both pre-committed capital
amounts and P&L Changes for each Measurement Period.
Thus, the reports made possible a simple comparison of the
pre-committed capital amount for each Measurement
Period with, if applicable, the negative cumulative P&L
Change calculated as of the end of such Measurement
Period. Each Participating Institution reported its P&L
Change for each Measurement Period irrespective of whether
the P&L Change was positive (a profit) or negative (a loss).2 
The Clearing House also prepared and distributed
to all of the Agencies and to the Participating Institutions
an “Aggregate Data Report.” The Aggregate Data Report
is cumulative (see table). It shows, for each Participating
Institution (identified by number instead of name for
confidentiality reasons) and Measurement Period, the ratio
of such Participating Institution’s P&L Change to its pre-
committed capital amount for the relevant Measurement
Period.










1 0.56 1.21 1.39 1.09
2 2.27 1.20 2.18 0.96
3 3.56 3.79 3.25 3.61
4 0.44 0.59 0.74 0.84
5 1.84 2.92 1.89 1.81
6 0.42 0.68 0.75 0.54
7 0.81 1.01 1.12 1.12
8 0.77 0.42 1.15 0.91
9 5.43 5.89 5.11 6.60
10 1.46 1.99 1.36 1.88
Notes:  P&L is trading profit and loss on consolidated trading activities for the Measurement Period. PCA is the pre-committed capital amount for market risk for the 
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II. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PILOT
The Participating Institutions drew the following conclu-
sions from the Pilot of the Pre-Commitment Approach:
1. In the view of the Participating Institutions, steps
should be taken to implement the Pre-Commitment
Approach, when properly structured and refined,
as a replacement for existing market risk capital
requirements. The Pilot demonstrated that the
Pre-Commitment Approach is a viable alternative
to the internal models approach for establishing
the capital adequacy of a trading business for regu-
latory purposes. The Participating Institutions
believe that the Pilot demonstrated that the
Pre-Commitment Approach provides strong incen-
tives for prudent risk management and more
efficient allocation of capital as compared with
other existing capital standards. The Participating
Institutions were able to establish and report in a
timely manner pre-committed capital amounts
and P&L Changes for the relevant Measurement
Periods. 
2. The Pilot in effect assigned to the Participating
Institutions the responsibility for determining an
appropriate level of capital, free of any regulatory
preconceptions as to what that specific level
should be. As a result of having to focus on an
appropriate amount of capital, the Pilot contrib-
uted to the development and depth of the Partici-
pating Institutions’ thinking as to the purpose of
capital and the distinction between the economic
capital maintained for the benefit of shareholders
to accommodate the variability of revenue and
income and the regulatory capital available to
protect the safety and soundness of the financial
system from the effects of unanticipated losses.
3. At the outset of the Pilot, it was anticipated that
the Aggregate Data Report would include the
ratio of the pre-committed capital amount to the
market risk capital requirement for each Partici-
pating Institution in each Measurement Period.
This turned out not to be feasible because the
Participating Institutions became certified to use
the internal models approach for market risk capital
requirements at different times. Nevertheless,
each Participating Institution has, on an informal
basis, compared its pre-committed capital amount
with its estimated market risk capital requirement
under the internal models approach; generally,
pre-committed capital amounts were significantly
less than the market risk capital requirements
estimated to apply under the market risk provi-
sions. The Participating Institutions believe that
the results of the Pilot suggest that the “3X”
multiplier, as well as the specific risk component,
even after the Basle Committee’s revision dated
September 17, 1997, lead to excessive regulatory
capital requirements for their trading positions.
4. As reflected in the Aggregate Data Report, no
Participating Institution reported a negative P&L
Change exceeding its pre-committed capital
amount. The Participating Institutions recognize
that the Pilot was conducted during a period of
moderate market volatility and generally favorable
trading results reported by financial institutions.
Nonetheless, the pre-committed capital amounts
were calculated to cover losses stemming from
unusual spikes in volatility and market reversals,
and the Participating Institutions would not
change the procedures, methods, and vetting pro-
cesses applied during the Pilot in light of the
unsettled markets in October 1997 following the
conclusion of the Pilot.
5. The ratios of P&L Changes to pre-committed capi-
tal amounts varied significantly. For example, the
ratios reported by Participating Institution no. 9
were generally five times that of Participating
Institution no. 4. The Participating Institutions are
not uncomfortable with the differences. Such differ-
ences arise from differences among the institutions
in the nature of their trading books, the varying
risk appetites and risk management techniques
among firms, differing ratios of proprietary trad-
ing revenues to customer flow revenues among
firms, and differing views as to the relationship
between economic and regulatory capital. It would
be of interest to know whether the Agencies,
which have access to the full spectrum of the data
underlying the Aggregate Data Report, have
additional insights as to the sources of differences
among the Participating Institutions, which did not
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III. LOOKING FORWARD
The Participating Institutions believe that the Pre-
Commitment Approach is a viable alternative to the internal
models approach for determining the capital adequacy of a
trading business, and that steps should be taken to refine
and ultimately implement the Pre-Commitment Approach.
Before further effort by the banking industry can be justi-
fied or progress made, it is essential that the Agencies
participate actively in the effort to refine how the Pre-
Commitment Approach will be implemented in practice.
Assuming the Agencies concur with the Partici-
pating Institutions’ views, implementation of the Pre-
Commitment Approach requires that the Agencies confirm
what penalties would apply if a banking institution vio-
lates the criteria for capital adequacy specified in the Pre-
Commitment Approach. The Participating Institutions
believe that disclosure is the appropriate penalty, and they
conducted the Pilot under the assumption that disclosure
would indeed be the penalty. It would be useful to discuss
with the Agencies whether they concur with this view, and
how they believe such disclosure might occur.
Finally, although the Pre-Commitment Approach
was initially proposed (and the Pilot was conducted) for
the market risk of trading businesses, the Participating
Institutions believe that the benefits of the Approach are
likely to exist when applied to other risks of trading busi-
nesses. The Pre-Commitment Approach goes directly to
the basic question of whether a business possesses adequate
capital to absorb unanticipated losses. The pre-committed
capital as applied to a business covers any risk—market,
specific, operational, legal, settlement—that has the
potential to create a loss. As a result, the Pre-Commitment
Approach avoids many of the complications and inefficien-
cies generated when capital charges are set separately for
each category of risk. Furthermore, institutions differ in how
they measure and manage the component risks, and the
correlations between the risks likely will vary according to
each institution’s business mix. The Pre-Commitment
Approach recognizes these differences while providing
incentives to ensure that minimum prudential standards
are maintained within the industry. 136 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
ENDNOTES
1. A Participating Institution’s pre-committed capital amount for a
Measurement Period did not cover, however, foreign exchange and
commodities positions outside the trading account (activities that are
covered in the market risk rule that was recently adopted).
2. If the Pre-Commitment Approach is implemented, only a negative
cumulative P&L Change for a Measurement Period having an absolute
value exceeding the relevant Participating Institution’s pre-committed
capital amount for such Measurement Period would give rise to a
disclosure requirement or other penalty. 
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